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opinion, the Court explained, did not 
exist.Id. 
The Court explained, however, that 
the affirmative defense known as "fair 
comment" was incorporat<;:d into com-
mon law, applying only to expressions of 
opinion. This principle, "afford[ed] legal 
immunity for the honest expression of 
opinion on matters of legitimate public 
interest when based upon a true or privi-
leged statement of fact." Id. at 2703 
(quoting 1 F. Harper & F. James, Law of 
Torts § 5.28 (1956». The Court found 
that the purpose of "fair comment" was 
to balance free and uninhibited discus-
sion of public issues with the need to 
redress injury to reputation caused by 
invidious irresponsible speech. Id. 
To further protect freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press and uninhibited 
debate, the Court explained, it began to 
require public officials to prove defama-
tory statements were made with 'actual 
malice.' Id. (citing New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964». The 
New York Times 'actual malice' test was 
later extended to public figures, defined 
as those persons "intimately involved in 
the resolution of important public ques-
tions or, by reason of their fame, shape 
events in areas of concern to society at 
large." Id. (quoting Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967». The 
required standard of proof for both pub-
lic officials and public figures, the Court 
noted, was clear and convincing evi-
dence.Id. at 2703-04 (citing Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 342). 
The distinction between public and 
private individuals, the Court reasoned, 
was predicated not only on the fact that 
public persons voluntarily exposed them-
selves to the increased risk of defama-
tion, but also had greater opportunity to 
counteract any false statements through 
effective communication channels. Id 
at 2704 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-
45). However, the Court did not extend 
the 'actual malice' standard to private 
persons concerning matters of public 
interest. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 ( 1971 ) ). 
The Court discussed further limita-
tions placed on the damages recovera-
ble in libel actions. First, liability could 
not be imposed without some showing 
of fault. Id. Second, punitive damages 
were not recoverable without a show-
ing of 'actual malice.' Id Finally, the 
Court had held that it could no longer 
be presumed that defamatory speech 
was false, as under common law. More-
over, the burden of showing falsity and 
fault was on the allegedly defamed plain-
tiff and not on the media defendant who 
previously was required to prove truth. 
Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc.v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776(1986». 
The Court then noted its recognition 
of constitutional limitations on the type 
of speech which could serve as a basis 
for a defamation action. Id Constitu-
tionallyprotected speech, not subject to 
defamation law included "loose figura-
tive speech," "merely rhetorical hyper-
bole," as well as, "lusty and imaginative 
expression of contempt." Id. at 2705 
(quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974». 
Milkovich, attempted to persuade the 
Court to recognize an additional protec-
tion for statements characterized as 
opinions as opposed to fact. He relied on 
dictum from Gertz which basically reit-
eratedJustice Holmes' "marketplace of 
ideas" concept. Id. Yet the argument, 
equating "opinion" with "idea," was re-
jected by the Court, which stated that 
the passage relied upon from Gertz was 
not "intended to create a wholesale def-
amation exception for anything that 
might be labeled 'opinion.'" Id. 
The Court noted that expressions of 
opinion may often imply an assertion of 
objective facts. Id. For example, the 
statement "[i]n my opinion Jones is a 
liar," the court believed could cause as 
much damage to one's reputation as the 
statement, "Jones is a liar." Id. at 2706. 
"[It] would be destructive of the law of 
libel if a writer could escape liability for 
accusationsof[ defumatoryconduct ] simply 
by using, explicitly or implicitly, the 
words 'I think.'" Id. (quoting Cianci v. 
New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 
64 (2d Cir. 1980». 
The Court stated that public figures 
and officials must show that defamatory 
statements were made with knowledge 
of their falsity or with reckless disregard 
of the truth. Id. at 2707. Alternatively, 
statements involving private individuals 
on matters of public concern place the 
burden on the plaintiff to show that the 
false connotations were made with some 
level of fault as required by Gertz. Id 
Thus, on matters of public concern, 
statements must be provable as false 
before liability can be imposed under 
state defamation laws, at least when they 
involve a media defendant. Id. (citing 
Hepps, 475 U.S. at 772). 
Turning to the facts of the instant 
case, the Court found that the language 
used in the article about Milkovich was 
not "loose, figurative or hyperbolic lan-
guage." Id Additionally, the Court stated 
that neither the language, nor the general 
tenor of the article, negated the impres-
sion that the author seriously maintained 
that Milkovich committed the crime of 
perjury. Id. 
The Court noted that the truth could 
be ascertained by comparing, inter alia, 
Milkovich's testimony at the OHSAA 
hearing with his subsequent testimony 
in trial court. Therefore, the connota-
tion that Milkovich committed perjury 
was an articulation of an objectively 
verifiable event. Id. Consequently, the 
Court remanded the case for a determi-
nation of whether or not the statements 
were false. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Su-
preme Court managed to intricately bal-
ance first amendment values. Namely, it 
balanced the vital guarantee of freedom 
of speech as it relates to the press and 
the uninhibited discussion of public 
issues against the pervasively strong in-
terest of preventing reputations from 
being falsely dishonored. Thus, the 
Court, in a unanimous decision, opted 
not to provide even more protection to 
media defendants by failing to recognize 
an opinion exception to state defama-
tion laws. 
- Kimberly A. Doyle 
Illinois v. Perkins: UNDERCOVER 
AGENTS NEED NOT GIVE 
MIRANDA WARNINGS TO 
INCARCERATED SUSPECTS 
BEFORE ASKING QUESTIONS 
WHICH MAY EliCIT 
INCRIMINATING RESPONSES 
In Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394 
( 1990), the Supreme Court held that 
the fifth amendment does not require 
undercover government agents posing 
as inmates to give Miranda warnings to 
incarcerated suspects before asking 
questions that may elicit incriminating 
responses. The Court found that no 
coercive atmosphere exists when an 
incarcerated suspect voluntarily makes 
incriminating statements to an officer 
he assumes to be a fellow inmate. 
__________________________________ 21.1/fheLawForum-37 
In November 1984, Richard Stephen-
son was murdered in East St. Louis, Illi-
nois. There were no suspects in the 
homicide until March 1986, when Don-
ald Charlton, an inmate of the Graham 
Correctional Facility, informed the po-
lice that he had pertinent information 
regarding the crime. A fellow inmate of 
Charlton's, Uoyd Perkins, had told him 
the details of a murder he committed in 
East St. Louis. 
Acting on Charlton's detailed account, 
which the police found to be credible, 
police traced Perkins to a jail in Mont-
gomery County, Illinois, where he was 
awaiting trial on an unrelated charge. In 
order to further investigate Perkins' re-
lation to the murder, police placed 
undercover agent,John Parisi, and Charl-
ton in a cellblock with Perkins. The two 
men were instructed to engage Perkins 
in casual conversation and report any 
reference made to the Stephenson 
murder. Parisi and Charlton gained Per-
kins' confidence by promising a fabri-
cated escape plot. In that murder could 
have been necessary to effectuate such a 
plot, Parisi inquired whether Perkins 
had ever murdered anyone before. Per-
kins responded by relaying the details of 
how he murdered Stephenson. At no 
time was Perkins given Miranda warn-
ings, and Perkins was subsequently 
charged with the Stephenson murder. 
At trial, Perkins moved to suppress his 
statements made to Parisi while in jail. 
The trial court granted the motion; the 
State appealed. In affirming, the appel-
late court held that Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966), "prohibits all 
undercover contacts with incarcerated 
suspects which are reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response." Per-
kins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether Miranda warnings must be 
given under such circumstances, and 
reversed. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
Kennedy, the Supreme Court first cited 
the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, which prohibits the 
admission into evidence of statements 
made during custodial interrogation, 
absent Miranda warnings. Custodial 
interrogation involves the questioning 
of a suspect in a coercive, police-
dominated atmosphere. [d. at 2397. The 
Court found that the doctrine was in-
38-The Law Forum/21.1 
tended to safeguard suspects from the 
"inherently compelling pressures which 
work to undermine the individual's will 
to resist and to compel him to speak 
where he would not otherwise do so 
freely." [d. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 467). 
The Court, however, distinguished 
Perkins from the concerns underlying 
Miranda. The problem of compulsion 
inherent in a police-dominated atmo-
sphere, the Court reasoned, is not pres-
ent when an incarcerated suspect speaks 
voluntarily to an undercover 
agent. "Coercion is determined from 
the perspective of the suspect." [d. (ci-
tations omitted). Thus, the coercive 
atmosphere is absent where a suspect 
speaks voluntarily to a fellow inmate, 
unaware that the inmate is a police 
officer. [d. 
Moreover, the Court rejected the state 
court's assumption that whenever a sus-
pect is in technical custody, Miranda 
warnings must precede any conversa-
tion with an undercover agent. [d. The 
Court reasoned that a suspect, unaware 
that he is speaking with an undercover 
agent, is neither motivated by pressure 
nor the reaction he expects from his 
listener. [d. at 2398. Miranda, the Court 
stated, was not intended to protect state-
ments motivated entirely by a suspect's 
desire to impress other inmates. When 
inmates boast to fellow inmates of their 
crimes, they do so at their own risk. Only 
when a suspect is under coercive pres-
sure to do so, must Miranda warnings 
be given. [d. 
In addressing the ploy used to elicit 
Perkins' statements, the Court found 
that" strategic deception" did not rise to 
the level of coercion and, was therefore 
not violative of the Self-Incrimination 
Clause. [d. (citations omitted). Relying 
_ primarily on HOffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293 ( 1966), the Court reiterated its 
approval of the use of deceptive tactics. 
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398. In Hoffa, 
incriminating statements made by the 
petitioner to a police informant who 
fooled him into believing that he was a 
colleague, were held admissible, in that 
they did not result from coercion. The 
only factual distinction between the 
cases, the Court noted, was that Perkins 
was incarcerated, a fact the Court con-
sidered irrelevant. [d. 
In addition, the Court distinguished 
ated suspect made incriminating state-
ments to an Internal Revenue Service 
agent absent Miranda warnings. [d. In 
Matbis, the suspect's statements were 
found to be inadmissible. However, in 
Matbis, the Court noted, the suspect 
was fully aware that the agent was a 
government official and was therefore 
susceptible to coercive pressure to 
answer questions. Perkins, on the other 
hand, was unaware of the undercover 
agent's official status. [d. 
Finally, the Court rejected the re-
spondent's argument that a bright-line 
rule for applying Miranda was desirable. 
[d. at 2389. The Court reasoned that law 
enforcement officials would have no 
problem implementing the holding that 
undercover agents need not Mirandize 
incarcerated suspects. [d. The holding 
clearly stated that Miranda concerns 
were not present in such cases, and 
therefore, Miranda warnings were not 
required under such circumstances. 
Finding no Miranda concerns impli-
cated when an undercover agent speaks 
with an incarcerated suspect, the Court 
held that Miranda warnings need not be 
given. The Court found arguments 
against the use of such deceptive tech-
niques and in favor of Miranda warnings 
in all custodial situations to be unper-
suasive. Thus, the use of undercover 
agents to elicit incriminating in-
formation from suspects was ruled to be 
a valid law-enforcement technique. 
- Tena Touzos 
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of 
Health: MISSOURI MAY REQUIRE 
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVI-
DENCE OF A PATIENT'S WISHES 
TO DISCONTINUE FOOD AND 
WATER 
In Cruzan v. MissouriDep'tofHealtb, 
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Supreme 
Court held that a state may apply a clear 
and convincing evidence standard in 
proceedings where a guardian seeks to 
discontinue nutrition and hydration of a 
person in a persistent vegetative state. 
Thus, unless the patient expressed his 
wishes sufficiently to meet 
this standard before incompetency, he 
would remain in a vegetative state indef-
initely, regardless of the objections and 
wishes of family members. 
